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Abstract 
The recent rise of anti-globalization political ideals is shifting the economic framework of 
international trade and investment. Going against the growing liberalization of intercountry 
relationships, events such as the election of President Donald Trump and Brexit suggest a 
near future of higher barriers to international movement of goods, services, people and 
capital. 
Several researchers have deepened the impact of trade protectionism, focusing on its effect 
on countries and companies’ trade relationships, economic gains and losses and 
consequences to Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) flows. Other studies have appreciatively 
discussed how business uncertainty derived from changes in the economic and trade 
framework impact on the investment decisions of multinational enterprises (MNEs). Extant 
literature has overlooked the combined impact of trade protectionism and business 
uncertainty on MNEs’ investment decisions (reflected in FDI flows). Furthermore, no 
empirical study exists on the impact of business uncertainty on these latter variables. 
The present dissertation aims at filling this gap by assessing the impact of trade protectionism 
and business uncertainty on the decisions of MNEs that invested in the United States of 
America (U.S.) in the recent past. 
Such an assessment is based on fixed effects panel data estimations, which is composed of 
the U.S. and 19 other countries, which make up 71% of the total inward FDI flows to the 
U.S., over 21 years (from 1996 to 2016). We regressed the MNEs’ aggregated investment 
decisions (measured by the outward FDI flows of each of the 19 countries to the U.S.) against 
the differentials of trade protection and economic policy uncertainty, controlling for a set of 
variables that are likely to influence those decisions (e.g., the differentials of GDP per capita, 
population growth, human capital, and Research & Development). 
Three main conclusions can be drawn from our estimations results: 1) MNEs are likely to 
use FDI as a means to overcome higher barriers to trade in the U.S.; 2) higher business 
uncertainty differentials failed to emerge as an inhibitor for foreign investment; 3) MNEs 
tend to use the U.S. as an export-platform to reach other relevant trading partners, which are 
geographically closer but present lower institutional quality than the U.S.. 
JEL – Codes: D81, F23, O24. 
Keywords: Foreign Direct Investment; protectionism; uncertainty; United States of 
America; multinational corporations.  
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Resumo 
O recente aumento de ideias políticos anti globalísticos tem vindo a alterar o paradigma 
económico de trocas e investimento internacionais. Contrariando a crescente liberalização 
de relações entre países, eventos como a nomeação do Presidente Donald Trump e o Brexit 
apontam para um futuro de maiores entraves à mobilidade internacional de bens, serviços, 
pessoas e capital. 
Vários investigadores aprofundaram o impacto económico do protecionismo, focando-se no 
efeito que este provoca sobre as relações comerciais entre países e empresas, ganhos e perdas 
económicas e as suas consequências no Investimento Direto Estrangeiro (IDE). Outros 
estudos analisam como a incerteza económica resultante de mudanças económicas e nas 
trocas comerciais influenciam as decisões de investimento de empresas multinacionais 
(MNEs). A literatura existente tem negligenciado o impacto conjunto do protecionismo 
comercial e incerteza empresarial nas decisões de investimento de MNEs (refletidas em 
fluxos de IDE). Para além disso, não existem estudos empíricos significativos sobre o 
impacto da incerteza empresarial nestas decisões. 
O presente estudo visa colmatar esta falha através da análise do impacto que a proteção sobre 
trocas comerciais e a incerteza empresarial têm sobre as decisões de MNEs que investem nos 
Estados Unidos da América (U.S.) num passado recente. 
Tal pesquisa é baseada numa estimação de painel de dados de efeitos fixos, composto pelos 
U.S. e mais 19 países, que constituem 71% do total de entradas de IDE nos U.S., ao longo 
de 21 anos (1996 a 2016). Estimámos uma regressão das decisões agregadas de investimento 
das MNEs (medidas pelos fluxos de saída de IDE de cada um dos 19 países para os U.S.) 
contra diferenciais de protecionismo e incerteza empresarial, controlando para um conjunto 
de variáveis que tendem a influenciar estas decisões (i.e., diferenciais de PIB per capita, 
crescimento demográfico, capital humano e Investigação & Desenvolvimento) 
Três principais conclusões podem ser retiradas dos nossos resultados: 1) MNEs tendem a 
usar o FDI como forma de ultrapassar maiores barreiras alfandegárias nos U.S.; 2) maiores 
diferenciais de incerteza empresarial não surgem como inibidores de investimento 
estrangeiro; 3) MNEs tendem a usar os U.S. como plataforma de exportação para alcançar 
os seus parceiros comerciais relevantes, que podem estar geograficamente mais próximos 
mas que apresentam menor qualidade institucional que os U.S.. 
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1. Introduction 
In a time where economic and trade freedom were at their peak and growing1, new foreign 
policies were implemented in two of the world’s biggest economies, the United Kingdom 
(U.K.) and the United States of America (U.S.).2  
U.K.’s “Brexit” (March 2017) and Donald Trump’s victory (November 2016) in the U.S. 
have come to contradict the trading trend that started after World War II and put a stop to 
the fall of customs barriers (Udbye, 2017). With new protectionist policies (e.g., barriers to 
the entry of goods and people), the U.S. and the U.K. now enter an era of bigger isolation 
from outside competition that can greatly impact their national-based companies.3 
The U.S. are, and have been for the last century, the largest economy in the world (World 
Economic Outlook, 2017) and home to nine of the world’s top twenty multinational 
enterprises (MNEs) (Fortune Global 500, 2017).4 The changes in U.S. foreign policy can 
have a tremendous impact not only internally but also in the rest of the World. If the U.S. 
continue to lift their trade walls and contradict the world’s globalization trend, it is likely that 
both American and non-American MNEs will have to change their strategies in order to 
thrive. 
One of the most notable and immediate impacts of this new wave of protectionist policies 
is the rise of uncertainty, most notably business and economic uncertainty, which is likely to 
play a critical role in the long-run decisions of consumers and companies (Bloom, 2017). 
Given the more forward-looking mentality of companies, the increase in such uncertainty 
will, mostly and primarily, affect investment, with a smaller response of consumption 
(Bloom, 2017). Investment is likely to be also greatly influenced by the changes in trade and 
migration that these policies might bring (Globerman, 2017).  
Extant literature in this area has explored multinational enterprises’ investment decisions 
(e.g., Shroff, Verdi and Yu, 2014) and uncertainty (e.g., Barrero, Bloom and Wright, 2017), 
but rather in isolation. There remains a clear gap in the literature, which is reflected by the 
absence of empirical studies that analyze MNEs investment decisions in a context of 
                                               
 
1 As shown by The Heritage Foundation’s Index of Economic Freedom, in https://www.heritage.org/index/, 
accessed on 03/12/2017 
2 As PwC demonstrates in its report Brexit Monitor: The impact of Brexit on (Global) trade, in 
https://www.pwc.nl/nl/brexit/documents/pwc-brexit-monitor-trade.pdf, accessed on 03/12/2017. 
3 As Morgan Stanley concludes in its assessment of the Risks & Impact of U.S. Protectionism, in 
https://www.morganstanley.com/ideas/protectionism-risks-are-rising, accessed on 17/10/2017. 
4 In http://fortune.com/global500/, accessed on 27/10/2017. 
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increasing uncertainty derived from new protectionist waves. Some authors have studied the 
impact of trade openness and non-tariff barriers on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) (e.g., 
Taylor, 2000) and how different legal and informational environments can shape these 
decisions (e.g., Oh and Rivera, 2013). However, such contributions do not focus on 
economic policy uncertainty. Studies dealing with the issues of uncertainty have mainly 
focused on exchange rates risks (e.g., Akiba and Deseatnicov, 2016), but have overlooked 
how increases in investment risk influence the decisions of MNEs. In this context, the 
empirical analysis of the relationship between trade protectionism, business uncertainty and 
MNEs’ investment decisions is on demand. 
The present dissertation aims at filling this literature gap by assessing the extent to which the 
differentials between U.S. and a group of their major trading patterns at the level of trade 
policy and the economic/business uncertainty impact on the investment decisions of 
multinational enterprises (MNEs). 
Complementing the extant studies in the area, which rely mainly on descriptive analysis, in 
methodological terms the present dissertation resorts to panel data econometric estimations, 
involving 20 countries (the U.S. plus other 19 countries, which represent more than 70% of 
the U.S. trade5) over a period of 21 years (1996 to 2016). The econometric specification 
regresses the MNEs aggregate investment decisions (that is, the outward FDI flows from 
these 19 countries to the U.S.) against a set of explanatory variables, including trade 
protection (tariffs and FDI restrictiveness differentials between the U.S. and the 19 
countries), and economic/business and policy uncertainty (Economic Policy Uncertainty 
Index differential between the U.S. and the 19 countries). 
The dissertation is organized as follows. Next section (Section 2) provides a literature review 
on the main issues of the paper: protectionism, uncertainty and FDI flows (that is, MNEs 
investment decisions). Then, Section 3 details the methodology. Section 4 presents and 
discusses the empirical results. Finally, Section 5 puts forward the study’s main conclusion, 
policy implications, limitations and paths for future research. 
 
  
                                               
 
5 Located in four continents: America (Brazil; Canada; Chile; Mexico); Europe (France; Germany; Ireland; Italy; 
Netherlands; Spain; Sweden; U.K., Russia); Asia (China; India; Japan; South Korea; Singapore); and Oceania 
(Australia). 
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2. Literature review on trade protectionism, uncertainty and Foreign Direct 
Investment  
2.1. Trade protectionism  
2.1.1. Defining protectionism and types of protectionism policies  
A country’s foreign policy can cover a wide range of aspects, from language and culture, on 
the one hand, to military and defense policy on the other; in-between, we can find aid, 
diplomacy and trade, the most relevant economic-related (Gordon, 1997).  
In terms of trade, many theories have emerged over the years, starting with Adam Smith’s 
Theory of Absolute Advantage (Smith, 1776), the first to argue that unrestricted trade was 
advantageous for countries, followed by David Ricardo’s Theory of Comparative Advantage 
(Ricardo, 1817). These theories have been built on the notion that free trade was on a 
country’s best interest; however, many countries have adopted restrictive measures that 
influence and prevent trade. 
The imposition of trade barriers or restrictions is the basic concept of protectionism (Mayda 
and Rodrik, 2005). Contradicting Adam Smith or David Ricardo’s theories, governments all 
over the world tend to adopt (in distinct degrees) policies to restrict spending on foreign 
goods and, in that way, shift demand towards domestic goods (Eichengreen and Irwin, 2010). 
This is one of the criteria that categorize a state policy as protectionist: it has to be adopted 
with the intent of improving the competitive position of domestic economic actors at the 
expense of foreign competitors; besides that, it has to be similar in form to the traditional 
instruments of protectionism (Regan, 1986). These traditional instruments, as per Regan 
(1986), can take three forms: tariffs, quotas or trade embargos. Tariffs are the oldest form of 
trade protection and consist of taxes imposed when a good or service is imported, either as 
a fixed charge or as a fraction of the value of the good/service, raising its cost; they have 
primarily been used as a source of income for countries (Krugman and Obstfeld, 2003). 
Quotas limit the quantities that can be imported or exported (Feenstra, 1992) and outright 
embargos restrict trade to specific countries or industries.  
New forms of protectionism have emerged throughout the years, namely antidumping 
regulations, duties imposed when it is determined that a foreign firm is selling their products 
at a ‘less than fair value’ (Blonigen, Flynn and Gallaway, 1998), which are currently used in 
the U.S. by both the government and national enterprises as a way to fight (fair) foreign 
competition (Kaempfer, Tower and Willet, 2002), and subsidies, used to promote exports of 
a certain company or industry in the international markets (Hill, 2009).  
4 
In economic terms, protectionism has arisen, throughout the years, as a response to cyclical 
crisis, like the outbreak of restrictive trade policies that emerged during the Great Depression 
of the 1930s (Eichengreen and Irwin, 2010), as a means to protect new (mainly 
manufacturing) industries that, as the Infant Industry Argument implies, early on cannot 
compete with foreign threats (Melitz, 2004), or to help domestic firms obtain first-move 
advantages and gain power in newly emerging industries, which is known as strategic trade 
policy (Brander, 1995). In political terms, governments have justified intervention in trade 
with the protection of jobs, consumers, national security or human rights (Hill, 2009). 
Protectionism can also entail protection from foreign investment. Liberalization of the equity 
market would give foreign investors better opportunities to invest in domestic companies, 
or vice versa, increasing a country’s economic growth (Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad, 2005). 
However, there are barriers that can be imposed by governments or surge from a country’s 
culture or conditions that prevent or drive away foreign investment. In this case, 
protectionism will not take the form of the traditional instruments described by Regan 
(1986), but instead present themselves as non-tariff barriers. However, it is important to note 
that goods and services’ protectionism is also a factor that drives FDI away from a country 
(Garibaldi, Mora, Sahay and Zettlemeyer, 2001).  
In terms of government-imposed barriers, according to Sauvant (2009), there are two 
situations in which regulatory measures can be considered FDI protectionism: in the case of 
inward FDI, if the governmental measures are used to hinder or deter foreign direct investors 
from investing or staying in the host country; in the case of outward flows, FDI 
protectionism occurs when measures which require domestic companies to repatriate assets 
or operations to the home country or dissuade further investments abroad are implemented.  
In the United States, regarding inward FDI, protectionism has been materialized in the 
strengthening of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) by the 
Foreign Investment and National Security Act (FINSA), which pays special attention to 
Mergers and Acquisitions (M&A) to “ensure national security”.6 The committee investigates 
(and potentially enforces conditions on) a transaction that gives foreign control over a U.S. 
business if it is believed it might present any significant threat to national security; if so, 
CFIUS tries to mitigate that through contractual commitments by the parties involved 
(Sauvant, 2009). 
                                               
 
6  Foreign Investment and National Security Act, 2007. 
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Besides FDI protectionism, there are other barriers that drive foreign investment away from 
a country. The investment decision of MNEs is decisively shaped by how much can the 
investment risk be minimized (Bitzenis, Tsitouras and Vlachos, 2009). In that sense, factors 
such as the legal framework, specially tax-wise, macroeconomic conditions, infrastructures 
and business environment are crucial (Bitzenis and Szamosi, 2009).  
Indirectly, other factors might weight in companies’ international investment decisions. For 
example, geographical location, infrastructures and culture are factors that might constitute 
obstacles to investment flows (Bitzenis and Szamosi, 2009). Moreover, the information 
environment, not only might restrict/enhance FDI flows to a country, but it can also 
facilitate a company’s response to local growth opportunities (Shroff, Verdi and Yu, 2014). 
A government’s protectionist policy against FDI might also include these types of barriers, 
besides or instead of restricting access to equity markets, as a way to protect national 
corporations or public interests (Sauvant, 2009).  
 
2.1.2. The theoretical economic implications of protectionism 
The economic impacts of protectionism can be studied according to different parties: 
countries, domestic and foreign companies, consumers, and government (Feenstra, 1992).7  
Firstly, in a global manner, when a country imposes a restriction to imports, the effects are 
felt internally, as the prices of the imported goods or services rise, either due to a surcharge 
over the price or due to a contraction of supply (Feenstra, 1992). This effect happens with 
either tariffs or import quotas. The biggest benefactors from this change are domestic 
producers that can now sell more of their products at a higher price, whereas the biggest 
impaired party would be consumers, which now buy less at a higher price. Overall, the 
imposition of a trade barrier of this manner would be harmful for a nation, as deadweight 
losses would arise, surpassing the possible producer gains (Feenstra, 1992). 
Other barriers can, even unintentionally, impact imports, such as regulatory frameworks 
(Chrystal, Coughlin and Wood, 1988). Environmental regulations, for example, have been 
known to restrict inwards FDI flows, especially if the country is less democratic in other 
issues (Oh and Rivera, 2013).  
In terms of exports-related protectionism, there can be large implications arising from 
government intervention. For example, Boeing is, currently, a powerhouse in the commercial 
                                               
 
7 In the present study, we focus on a country level. 
6 
aircraft industry not just because it was a first mover and was able to establish competitive 
advantages, but also due to state subsidies from the U.S. Government and NASA, which 
resulted in the biggest case presented for review to the World Trade Organization (WTO) at 
the time (Wittig, 2011). The protection of infant industries can also be very significant 
internationally. By making sure that an industry can start its development shielded from 
competition from foreign firms, governments allow companies to grow, learn-by-doing and 
achieve economies of scale (Bardhan, 1971).  
Regarding FDI protectionism and other barriers that discourage foreign investment, the 
impacts can also be measured in the multinational enterprises that seek this investment and 
in the host companies/countries. To the former, the impacts of the existence of these 
barriers is going to be the increase in investment risk and, consequently, the reduction of 
FDI engaged by these companies. This will result in a loss of the original motives that drive 
MNEs to invest outside of their country of origin, which, according to Dunning (1988) and 
Bitzenis (2003), can be summarize as: market seeking (explore demand or growth 
opportunities in the host country), resource seeking (e.g. natural resources, organizational 
advantages, technology or human capital), efficiency seeking (i.e. economies of scale and risk 
diversification), ownership advantages (e.g. know-how, product innovation) and financial 
aspects (tax benefits or other financial incentives).  
The host country and company are going to lose due to the decrease in direct investment 
which, subsequently, reduces or ceases altogether the advantages FDI might bring. 
According to Bekaert, Harvey and Lundblad (2005), equity market liberalization and more 
foreign investment lead to a growth in the host companies, increasing annual real per capita 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in approximately 1%. Such growth can come from two 
main points of change, besides the increase in capital FDI implies: firstly, FDI can greatly 
contribute to an increase in production efficiency and production frontier, besides having a 
big role in technological progress (Yao and Wei, 2007); then, foreign investment can generate 
productivity spillovers (Haskel, Pereira and Slaughter, 2007) since foreign firms bring 
technological know-how, marketing and managerial skills that are passed on to the host 
companies to help them raise productivity (Crespo, Fontoura and Proença, 2002).  
 
From the above theoretical arguments, we conjecture that:  
H1: Protectionism negatively impacts on MNEs’ investment decisions. 
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2.2. Business uncertainty and multinational enterprises’ investment strategies 
The balance between risk and reward is the main decisive factor in companies’ investment 
decisions. Due to their more forward-looking nature, companies tend to react to risk and 
uncertainty more strongly than consumers (Bloom, 2017). 
Different events cause different shocks of uncertainty, which, in turn, impact companies 
differently. Barrero, Bloom and Wright (2017) conducted a study to understand this 
relationship by analyzing the effect of four factors at a company level: oil price, exchange 
rates, economic policy and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) turnover. They concluded that 
oil price volatility has a defining role in short-turn uncertainty, while slow-moving drivers, 
such as the economic policy, are mostly connected with long-run uncertainty. CEO turnover 
and exchange rates affect short and long run uncertainty in a similar manner. Furthermore, 
the same study tried to understand how this shaped companies’ investment decisions. They 
concluded that long-run uncertainty and, therefore, economic policy uncertainty, mostly 
impacts companies’ Research and Development (R&D) and investment, while employment 
is sensitive to both horizons. Bloom (2017) also concluded that, amongst aggregated 
components, investment is, by far, the most sensitive to economic policy uncertainty.  
The actual impact that uncertainty has on investment has been further studied through the 
real options theory. The basis of this theory advocates that, facing an (irreversible) 
investment opportunity, at the start or during a project, a company has the option to delay, 
expand, switch, suspend, contract or abandon the investment (Lambrecht, 2017). These 
options can be seen as a financial call-option, has they give the investor the right but not the 
obligation to invest; when the decision of investment is made, the company exercises the 
option, terminating that opportunity. Therefore, another cost is added to the project, an 
opportunity cost for the lost option (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994). 
The investment rule in this theory is that a company should invest if the project’s value 
exceeds the costs by an amount equal to the value of the waiting option (Sarkar, 2000). Under 
uncertainty, the difference in value of the marginal product of capital that justifies investment 
and the one that justifies disinvestment increases (Bloom, Bond and Reenen, 2007). The 
option to wait becomes more valuable under these circumstances, resulting in a 
discouragement of investment, as the investment rule for this theory becomes harder to 
achieve (Mauer and Ott, 1995). Therefore, under periods of uncertainty, the real option 
theory estimates a negative impact on investment by firms. 
8 
This conclusion can be very significant given the new international developments. The 
election of Donald Trump and of populist parties across Europe, which propose radical new 
policies, have massively increased policy uncertainty (Bloom, 2017). In light of these events, 
FDI might be of the most affected variables, as MNEs become more cautious and prefer to 
wait than to undertake big, costly projects with unreliable outcomes (Bloom, Bond and 
Reenen, 2007). 
In this context, we hypothesize that: 
H2: Uncertainty negatively impacts on MNEs’ investment decisions. 
 
2.3. Scientific empirical evidence on protectionism, uncertainty and multinational 
enterprises’ investment strategies 
There have been many studies that focus on investment decisions of multinational 
corporations and factors that condition those decisions (e.g., Guillen and Zhou, 2016), as 
well as studies analyzing business uncertainty (e.g., Handley and Limão, 2015). 
Notwithstanding, the link between business uncertainty associated to increasing trade 
protectionism and MNEs’ investment decisions has been overlooked – see Table 1.  
In terms of investment decisions of MNEs, several studies focused on the impact of entrance 
barriers and governments trade policy on FDI (Sauvant, 2009). These contributions 
established that an increase in FDI and trade openness lead to an increase in foreign 
investment in those countries (Taylor, 2000). Moreover, other factors, such as GDP, wages, 
inflation and foreign companies’ profits impact on countries’ investment attractiveness 
(Bitzenis, Tsitouras and Vlachos, 2009). Studies which have focused on non-tariff barriers 
and their impact on international investment flows showed, for instance, that MNEs are 
more likely to enter a country with stricter environmental laws than their home country the 
more democratic that host country is (Oh and Rivera, 2013). Still regarding MNEs’ decision 
making, but focusing on the impact of the information environment, Shroff, Verdi and Yu 
(2014), concluded that, when the environment is adequate, subsidiary expansion investment 
tends to be higher; additionally, the impact of information environment on investment 
sensitivity is greater when there are more cross-border frictions and the parent is more 
involved in the investment decisions of subsidiaries. 
Thus, albeit several studies have long recognized the importance of studying management 
under uncertainty (Akiba and Deseatnicov, 2016), most of the extant literature on MNE’s 
9 
investment decisions does not specifically focus on economic or foreign/trade policy 
uncertainty. Regarding uncertainty, the most discussed topic relates to exchange rate 
uncertainty. This stream of literature has shown that changes in FDI flows can be associated 
with variations in exchange rate risk and that MNEs might tolerate a higher uncertainty in 
developed (but not in developing) countries when that is associated with higher profits 
(Akiba and Deseatnicov, 2016).  
Applying the real option theory in international investment, Kim, Makhija and Song (2015) 
suggest there is still much room to be explored so that we can better understand how MNEs 
behave and should strategize foreign investment given uncertainty environments and 
situations. 
 
Table 1: Uncovering the literature lacuna in studies dealing with MNEs investment decisions, trade 
protectionism and uncertainty 
Broad 
topics 
Sub-topics 
MNEs’ 
investment 
decisions 
Trade 
protectionism 
Uncertainty 
Type of 
analysis 
Studies  
MNEs’ 
investment 
decisions  
Impact of 
entrance barriers 
and 
governments 
trade policy on 
FDI 
x x  Qualitative 
Bitzenis, 
Tsitouras and 
Vlachos 
(2009) 
Non-tariff 
barriers and their 
impact on 
international 
investment flows 
x x  Quantitative 
Oh and Rivera 
(2013) 
The information 
environment 
x   Quantitative 
Shroff, Verdi 
and Yu (2014) 
Uncertainty 
FDI flows and 
exchange rate 
risk 
x  x Quantitative 
Akiba and 
Deseatnicov 
(2016) 
Type of 
uncertainty and 
GDP 
components 
  x Descriptive Bloom (2017) 
MNEs’ 
investment 
decisions 
and 
uncertainty 
FDI dynamics 
and trade 
protectionism 
x x x 
Descriptive, 
appreciative 
Globerman 
(2016) 
Legend: x – the study analyses the topic. 
 
A very recent set of papers discusses, in an appreciative manner, the issue of economic policy 
uncertainty and companies’ investment decisions. For instance, Nicholas Bloom has 
published some papers that focus on the evolution of the economic policy uncertainty (EPU) 
index and discusses the effect of this type of uncertainty on the GDP components. He 
uncovered that investment is the variable that is more volatile to changes in the level of 
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uncertainty, with a small response from consumption and no response from government 
expenditure, due to the more forward-looking vision of companies when compared with the 
one from consumers (Bloom, 2017). Additionally, Barrero, Bloom and Wright (2017) 
concluded that uncertainty can have different effects depending on the type of situation that 
originate the reactions: cyclical, temporary drivers, such as oil price volatility, are highly 
connected with short-run uncertainty, while slow-moving, more radical drivers, like 
economic policy, are linked with long-run uncertainty. These same authors have shown that 
investment and R&D are more sensitive to long-run uncertainty, but their analysis does not 
explore MNEs’ investment decisions. 
Studies specifically focused on FDI dynamics and the eventual increase in trade 
protectionism associated with recent major international political changes, most notably, 
Britain’s “Brexit” or Donald Trump’s election, brought the issue of (trade) protectionism, 
uncertainty and MNEs’ investment strategies to the highlights. Steve Globerman (2016) 
concluded that an increase in global trade protectionism and increased barriers to the 
movement of people are likely to further slow the growth of FDI or even result in a decline 
of international investment flows. However, these observations are, once again, merely 
descriptive and do not provide an in-depth account of the impact these changes might have 
on MNEs’ investment decisions.  
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3. Methodological considerations 
Our main research question is focused on the U.S. trade policy (vis-à-vis other countries) 
and how such trade policy and the business uncertainty impact MNEs’ investment decisions, 
testing the following hypotheses: 
H1: Protectionism negatively impacts on MNEs’ investment decisions. 
H2: Uncertainty negatively impacts on MNEs’ investment decisions. 
In order to test the study’s main hypotheses, we selected a quantitative methodology. As 
earlier referred, the existing studies address the topics selected mainly in descriptive or 
qualitative manner (see Table 1). Quantitative studies in these fields are focused on a specific 
scope (e.g. exchange rate or information environment) or on a firm-level. Therefore, the 
methodology proposed here is innovative as it presents a broad, cross-country/time analysis 
that can serve as a basis to study the near-future changes in the American economy. 
Specifically, we resort to econometric panel data models. As underlined by Hsiao (2007: 2), 
“[p]anel data, by blending the inter-individual differences and intra-individual dynamics have 
several advantages over cross-sectional or time-series data: (i) More accurate inference of 
model parameters; (…) (ii) Greater capacity for capturing the complexity of human behavior 
than a single cross-section or time series data (…) by (ii.b) Controlling the impact of omitted 
variables (…) [and] (ii.c) Uncovering dynamic relationships.”   
The econometric specification is: 
𝑶𝑭𝑫𝑰𝒊𝒕 = 𝜷𝟏 + 𝜷𝟐𝑻𝑹𝑭𝑹𝑬𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑𝑭𝑫𝑰𝑷𝑹𝑶𝑻𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑼𝑵𝑪𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕, 
where  
i indexes country of origin of the MNEs (i=1, …19)8 and t indexes time (t=1, …, 21) 
OFDI measures the outward FDI flows from country i to the U.S. 
TRFREE estimates the trade freedom of entry of goods and services of the U.S. minus the 
trade freedom of country i 
FDIPROT represents FDI restrictions of the U.S. minus the restrictions in country i   
UNC is the business uncertainty differential between the U.S. and country i.  
X represents the vector of control variable, which include the Gross Domestic Product per 
capita (GDP pc), population growth, Human Capital, and R&D differentials between the 
U.S. and country i 
ε is the residual error term that captures the effect of non-observed variables. 
                                               
 
8 The list of the 19 countries is in Table A1 in the Appendix. 
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All data was collected from publicly available information from American and international 
databases. The FDI flows were collected from the Bureau of Economic Analysis of the U.S. 
Department of Commerce, trade freedom was measured through the Trade Freedom Index of 
The Heritage Foundation, FDI restrictions were collected from OECD’s International Direct 
Investment Statistics and the uncertainty data was retrieved from the Economic Policy Uncertainty. 
The control variables’ differentials were calculated using data from the World Bank and the 
Penn World Tables. 
Nineteen countries were selected to our panel: Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, 
United Kingdom, Spain, Sweden, Russia, China, India, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, 
Australia, Canada, Brazil, Chile and Mexico. Data was collected from a range of twenty-one 
years, from 1996 to 2016. 
Table 2 describes the main proxies of the relevant variables as well as their data sources. 
Table 2: Proxies of the relevant variables 
 
Variable Description 
Data 
availabilit
y 
Source 
Dependent 
variables 
Outward flows of 
country i to U.S. 
(OFDI) 
Foreign Direct Investment in the 
United States by country (in 
Millions of dollars) 
1980-2016 
Bureau of 
Economic Analysis, 
U.S. Department of 
Commerce 
Core 
independent 
variables 
Trade Freedom 
differential 
(TRFREE) 
Trade Freedom Index of U.S. 
minus the Trade Freedom Index 
of country i 
1996-2016 
The Heritage 
Foundation, U.S. 
FDI restrictions 
differential 
(FDIPROT) 
Differential between the U.S. and 
country i of index of 
restrictiveness of a country’s FDI 
rules by looking at four main 
types of restrictions: foreign 
equity restrictions; discriminatory 
screening or approval 
mechanisms; restrictions on key 
foreign personnel and operational 
restrictions. 
2003-2016 
OECD 
International Direct 
Investment 
Statistics 
Business 
uncertainty 
differential (UNC) 
Differential of Economic Policy 
Uncertainty (EPU) Index (based 
on newspaper-based EPU Index) 
between the U.S. and country i 
1985-2017 
Economic Policy 
Uncertainty 
Control 
variables 
GDP per capita differential (U.S. minus country i) 
1960-2016 
World Bank 
Indicators 
Population growth differential (U.S. minus country i) 
Human Capital differential (U.S. minus country i) 
R&D differential (U.S. minus country i) 
  
13 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. A general overview of United States’ Trade and Foreign Direct Investment  
In September 2008, following the collapse of the investment bank Lehman Brothers and the 
public rescue of several financial institutions in the U.S. and Europe, the financial crisis that 
had started a year before escalated. The following year, for the first time since this indicator 
is measured, a negative global Gross Domestic Product growth rate was registered. The 
collapse of U.S. imports and exports that resulted from this were of a magnitude unique in 
historical terms, only comparable to the 2001 recession (Levchenko, Lewis, and Tesar, 2009). 
In the following year, global GDP registered a growth of -1.73%, according to the World 
Bank,9 as exports and imports decreased by 22.3% and 22.9%, respectively, according to 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)10 statistics, while the 
United States’ GDP, exports and imports grew -2.78%, -14.0% and -22.9%, respectively 
(Bureau of Economic Analysis11). The drop in these trade variables compared with the one 
in the GDP was far greater than any registered during a crisis prior to this century – see 
Figure 1. 
  
Figure 1: Trade openness index for the U.S., 1960-2016 
Source: The World Bank Indicators. 
                                               
 
9 In https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.KD.ZG, accessed 27/10/2017. 
10 In http://unctadstat.unctad.org/wds/ReportFolders/reportFolders.aspx, accessed 27/10/2017. 
11 In https://www.bea.gov/international/index.htm#trade, accessed 27/10/2017. 
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The consequence of the crisis can also be observed in Figure 2, using data from the 
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) for the trade-to-GDP 
ratio12.  
In 2008, the U.S. registered a ratio of 15.4%, the lowest of the 35 OECD countries, well 
below the OECD average of 46.7%.  
 
Figure 2: Trade openness index for OECD countries, 2008-2009 
Source: OECD 
 
In terms of trade of goods and services, the United States had a much lower openness ratio 
regarding the second type of trade, with 3.3%, compared to 12% in trade of goods. In 2009, 
both of these types of trade had a lower openness ratio but the trade of goods registered the 
biggest fall. In a broad sense, the U.S. openness ratio in 2009 decreased by 2.8 percentage 
points to 12.6%, the second lowest of the OECD, still much lower than the organization’s 
average (41.3%). 
It was this scenario that Barack Obama faced in his first year as President, after taking office 
in January 2009. In the first year of the new Administration, the United States of America 
registered the lowest GDP growth rate since 194613 but demonstrated signs of slow recovery 
                                               
 
12 As stated by the OECD: “The trade-to-GDP ratio (…) is calculated for each country as the simple average (i.e. 
the mean) of total trade (i.e. the sum of exports and imports of goods and services) relative to GDP”. In, 
accessed 04/11/2017. 
13 In https://www.bea.gov/national/index.htm, accessed 27/10/2017. 
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by the end of the year, with quarterly GDP growth rates of 1.3% and 3.9% in the third and 
fourth quarters respectively.  
To improve the country’s recovery from the crisis, Obama approved, in March 2010, the 
National Export Initiative (NEI), which, as stated in its original Executive Order (Office of 
the Federal Register, 2010), intended to promote the participation of U.S. businesses in 
international markets through exports of goods and services to, in turn, boost economic 
growth and create high-paying jobs. It was based on five components: advocacy and trade 
promotion efforts on behalf of U.S. exporters, increase in export financing, removal of 
barriers to trade, enforcement of U.S. trade rules on their partners and promotion of a strong, 
sustainable and balanced growth (Export Promotion Cabinet, 2010). This initiative would, 
ultimately, be the major contributor factor for the achievement of the Administration’s goal 
of doubling exports by the end of 2014. 
But the NEI was only one of the first steps in a broader plan of the former presidency. Over 
the eight years it stood in office, the Obama Administration worked to expand agreements 
such as the Information Technology Agreement (ITA) of the World Trade Organization, 
whose main purpose is the elimination of tariffs on trade of IT products, worked closely with 
this organization to enforce trade rights, in order to promote and establish a fair-trading 
order worldwide, and established unilateral Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) with Korea 
(KORUS-FTA), Panama and Columbia. Furthermore, the administration negotiated the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the most significant trade initiative of the 21st century 
(Kotschwar, Muir, and Schott, 201314), between 12 countries, including Australia, Brunei, 
Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, New Zealand, Peru, Singapore, USA and Vietnam. 
This FTA intended to deepen economic ties between these nations by cutting tariffs and, 
eventually, create a single market in the future.  
The foreign trade policy adopted by Obama allowed the U.S. to recover from the financial 
crisis and grow in the following years, as BEA statistics show. From 2010 until the end of 
Obama’s second term, exports and imports grew, on average, 5.13% and 4.99% per year, 
respectively, and GDP, on average, 2.14% and, in 2015, exports of goods and services 
supported an estimated 11.5 million U.S. jobs, approximately 8% of U.S. total employment 
(Froman, 2017). 
                                               
 
14 https://piie.com/bookstore/understanding-trans-pacific-partnership, accessed 12/11/2017. 
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Despite the positive global frame of the behavior of exports and imports through the 
previous administration and a good recovery following the financial crisis, Obama’s second 
term was less positive in terms of trade. After a good growth of the weight of exports and 
imports in the GDP, both variables’ development slowed down starting 2012. In 2014, both 
variables started to register a negative growth, not just in relation to the national product but 
also in absolute values (Figure 3).  
 
Figure 3: Trade, imports and exports of the U.S., in millions of dollars, 1995-2016 
Source: OECD 
 
The drop in this period can be associated with the strengthening of the U.S. dollar over this 
period. As data from the Federal Reserve15 shows, following three years (2011-2014) of a 
relatively low value, the price-adjusted dollar index registered a significant growth period that 
only seemed to stop earlier this year.  
The financial crisis also affected the financial flows related to Foreign Direct Investment 
(FDI) in and from the U.S. (see Figure 4).  
In 2007, the U.S. registered the highest level of FDI outflows in history and one of the 
highest levels of FDI inflows to date. The deepening of the financial crisis in 2008 resulted 
in a significant fall of both indicators, with U.S. firms investing 34.42% less abroad than in 
the previous year, which translates into a decrease of 108.31 billion dollars. The inward flows 
of capital only started to decrease the year after, but registered a larger relative drop, with 
                                               
 
15 https://www.federalreserve.gov/releases/h10/Summary/indexbc_m.htm, accessed on 26/11/2017. 
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foreign MNEs reducing their investments in the U.S. in more than half (53.78%), resulting 
in a fall of 178.95 million dollars.  
 
Figure 4: Foreign Direct Investment inflows and outflows in the U.S., in millions of dollars, 1960-
2016 
Source: Own computations based on data by the World Bank Indicators. 
 
The changes implemented by President Obama, internally and with Trade Agreements, 
helped U.S. companies recover, with the outward FDI flows recording positive growth rates 
until 2012. After this year, domestic companies have slowed their investments abroad. In 
terms of inward FDI flows, the changes promoted by the new Administration had a very 
positive effect in attracting foreign MNEs’ investment. In the 8 years it stood in office, this 
Government was able to increase the entry of capital from foreign MNEs in 44,08% to an 
historically high amount in 2015. 
 
4.2. Descriptive and exploratory statistics of the variables included in the econometric 
specification: U.S. and its 19 main trade /FDI partners, 1996-2016 
The panel built to estimate the model allows us to analyze key variables of the 19 countries 
between 1996 and 2016. To facilitate the comparison, some analyses have been performed 
organizing the countries into seven categories, including 4 blocks of countries - Europe 
(France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom); Pacific 
Asia (Japan, South Korea and Singapore); and Latin America (Brazil, Chile and Mexico), 
China and India, and 3 isolated countries - Australia, Canada, and Russia. 
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4.2.1. Outward Foreign Direct Investment 
The following seven graphs present a cross-time display of the evolution of 19 countries’ 
real OFDI to the U.S., aggregated by country group. 
Europe and Canada stand out as the group and country which most invest on the United 
States. The European average of 114 600 million dollars per year of FDI flows to the U.S. is 
greatly increased by the investment performed by Great Britain, which is, by a large margin, 
the biggest source of foreign investment into the U.S. since 2004 (see Figure 6).  
Europe 
 
Russia 
 
China & India 
 
Pacific Asia 
 
Australia 
 
Latin America 
 
Canada 
 
Figure 5: Foreign Direct Investment flows per country category, in billions of dollars, 1996-2016 
Note: Europe includes France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom; Pacific Asia includes Japan, South Korea and 
Singapore; Latin America includes Brazil, Chile and Mexico. 
Source: Own computation based on data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
Six countries demonstrate a clearly superior level of investment in the U.S.. Of these six, four 
are located in Europe: United Kingdom, Netherlands, Germany and France. This helps to 
explain why Europe is the group that invests the most on the U.S., as shown in Table 3. 
Table 3: Average OFDI to U.S. by country group, in millions of dollars, 1996-2016 
Country/Group Average OFDI 
Europe 114 660.10 
Russia 3 171.85 
China &India 4 073.03 
Asia Pacific 85 530.01 
Australia 33 350.37 
Latin America 3 247.84 
Canada 163 666.30 
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Canada was, until 2014, the largest single-country trading partner of the United States 
(according to U.S. Census data16). The two economies are, for their geographical proximity 
and social and economic similarities, highly integrated (Fergusson, 2011). In 1989, Canada 
and the U.S. established their first Free Trade Agreement, which later was replaced by the 
NAFTA. In terms of direct investment, Canada was, in 2016, the country with the third 
largest flow, with 163 666 million dollars. 
The Asia Pacific is the group with the second highest value of investment flows to the U.S. 
across the 21 years. This is, in large part, due to the amount of capital flows from Japan, the 
country which presents the second highest FDI flow since 1999, year in which Britain 
became the largest investor.  
China and India, despite being the first and eight largest goods trading partners of the U.S. 
(according to U.S. Census data17), respectively, are not in the top twelve countries with the 
highest investment flows to the U.S.. 
The two lowest averages of OFDI in our panel belong to Russia and Latin America. This 
group’s average is lowered by Brazil, country which registered two years of divestment, 2009 
and 2016. In our last year of observation, Brazil presented the lowest value of OFDI 
registered, -2 755 million dollars. According to UNCTAD’s World Investment Report 2017,18 
the divestment in 2016 can be justified by the recession period that Brazil faced, by debt 
incurred by Petrobras, and by the divestment of foreign assets from Brazilian MNEs through 
cross-border M&As. 
 
4.2.2. Trade Freedom 
Figure 7 represents the evolution of the differential of trade freedom between the U.S. and 
country i across the years.  
The variable selected as a proxy of protectionism was the Trade Freedom Index of The 
Heritage Foundation, which accounts for trade tariffs and for non-tariff barriers. The index 
varies from 0 to 100, in which a higher score represents a higher level of freedom. Given 
                                               
 
16 In https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top1412yr.html, accessed on 
27/03/2018. 
17 In https://www.census.gov/foreign-trade/statistics/highlights/top/top1712yr.html, accessed on 
27/03/2018. 
18 In http://unctad.org/en/pages/PublicationWebflyer.aspx?publicationid=1782, accessed on 13/03/2018. 
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this, a positive differential means that the U.S. had, in a specific year, a smaller level of trade 
protectionism than country i. The black line in each graph marks the null differential between 
countries. 
All countries that are part of the Europe group were members of the European Union at the 
time of our study, a political and economic union. As such, its members have, internally, 
freedom of goods and services and a common external trade policy. Due to this fact, Europe 
presents many similar results between the different countries, reason why, in any given year, 
we can only see up to three values on its graph. In general, Europe presents a positive but 
almost null Trade Freedom differential with the U.S.. 
Russia, China and India have, across the years, a much smaller Trade Freedom index than 
the U.S.. With an average differential of 21 points for Russia and 34 for China and India, the 
three countries present themselves, across the 21 years, as significantly more closed to foreign 
trade than the United States. However, it is important to note that, in all three cases, the 
differential has presented a downwards trajectory through the years, signalizing that these 
countries might be opening up to international markets. 
The countries from Pacific Asia present, in this variable, slightly different results amongst 
them. Singapore has, across the 21 years, a slightly higher Trade Freedom index than the 
U.S., as South Korea, on the other hand, has a much lower average level of Freedom. Japan’s 
index registered almost no growth along the years; as the U.S. Trade Freedom increased, the 
differential between the two countries grew in favor of the United States but its average is 
only of 2 points. 
Although Australia’s graphic shows scattered results, the Trade Freedom Indexes of this 
country and the U.S. are very similar, with the differential averaging 1.57 points across the 
years, with a standard deviation of 1.60. This is similar to what happens between the U.S. 
and Canada, whose differential averages -0.40 per year and the standard deviation is 1.80.  
Regarding Latin America, the differential is almost always positive across the 21 years, with 
only five negative results (from Mexico and Chile). The group presents the third highest 
average differential, which demonstrates the significantly lower openness to foreign trade of 
this countries when compared with the United States. 
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Figure 6: Trade Freedom Index Differential (U.S. minus country i) per country category, 1996-2016 
Note: Europe includes France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom; Pacific Asia includes Japan, 
South Korea and Singapore; Latin America includes Brazil, Chile and Mexico. 
Source: Own computation based on data from The Heritage Foundation 
 
4.2.3. Business uncertainty 
Figure 8 depicts the Economic Policy Uncertainty Index for the panel across the 21 years of 
observation. Similar to the previous case, this variable is presented as a differential between 
the U.S.’s level in a given year and the uncertainty of country i during that same timeframe. 
The black line on the graphs depicts a null differential, meaning that, with a value below the 
line, the level of uncertainty of the U.S. in a given year was smaller than that of country i. 
Up until the financial crisis of 2008, Europe maintained a cyclical differential with the U.S., 
with the first presenting, in general, a smaller level of uncertainty. After 2008, Europe went 
through a period of higher uncertainty and of much scattered indexes within the group, 
resulting in the U.S. having a smaller mean level of Economic Policy Uncertainty across the 
21 years of observation. Europe also presents the most negative value of differential, which 
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corresponds to the level felt in the United Kingdom in 2016, in big part due to the Brexit 
voting results (Bloom, 2017). 
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Figure 7: EPU Index Differential (U.S. minus county i) per country category, 1996-2016 
Note: Europe includes France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Sweden and United Kingdom; Pacific Asia includes Japan, 
South Korea and Singapore; Latin America includes Brazil, Chile and Mexico. 
Source: Own computation based on data from Economic Policy Uncertainty 
 
Russia and Canada present similar results and a similar pattern of differential across the years. 
The countries average differential is, respectively, -11.17 and -15.49, the two lowest means 
of the panel, and they both present a high standard deviation of results. The negative average 
witnessed across the 21 years is explained by the increase in uncertainty in the last 5 years. 
Although the United States presented high levels of uncertainty at the end of the period of 
observation, both Russia and Canada registered much higher economic uncertainty. 
On the other hand, China and India and Australia presented a mean level of uncertainty 
between 1996 and 2016 smaller than that of the U.S., with a low variance of results. The 
three countries had the highest minimum values of differentials and some of the smallest 
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maximum values, which resulted in uncertainty mean indexes of, respectively, 10.16 and 
15.66. 
Pacific Asia and Latin America had the smallest differential averages of the panel, 
demonstrating that their EPU was, in general, very similar to that of the United States. 
However, both groups present high levels of variance of results. In the case of the Pacific 
Asia countries, their levels of uncertainty started smaller than those of the U.S. but, over the 
years, the two started to converge and the Asian countries ended with slightly higher levels 
of uncertainty. The Latin American countries registered negative values of uncertainty at first 
but, as the uncertainty in the Unites States grew, the EPU index in the Latin countries started 
to decrease, resulting in the highest levels of uncertainty differential of the panel over the 21 
years. 
 
4.2.4. Other variables 
The average across the 21 years of the differentials of Gross Domestic Product per capita, 
Population Growth and Human Capital index and R&D expenditure are positive, meaning 
the United States present, on average, a better level in all of the control variables than the 
other 19 countries. 
In terms of GDP per capita, only one group has a higher average between 1996 and 2016, 
Australia. On the other hand, China and India are the group with the highest differential and 
also the one with the highest minimum and maximum value. 
Although the global average for population growth differential is positive, this only happens 
with Europe and Russia, the last one particularly high. With all other groups and countries, 
the differential is negative but close to null. 
The United States have, in general, a clearly higher Human Capital (HC) Index than the rest 
of the panel. All average differentials for the countries/groups are positive and there are only 
two countries with a higher level of HC index than the U.S. across the 21 years: Singapore 
in 2016 and the United Kingdom in the last seven years.  
Finally, in terms of R&D expenditure, all average differentials are positive, specially between 
the U.S. and China and India and Latin America, except for Pacific Asia, which has the 
closest differential to null. This is due to the higher R&D expenditure (in percentage of the 
GDP) of Japan than the U.S., which is one of the three countries with the negative 
differential through the 21 years, together with Sweden and South Korea. 
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4.2.5. Bi-variate relations among the relevant variables  
Table 4 evidences that FDI outflows (OFDI) targeting the USA are negatively related to 
‘Trade Freedom differential’ (TRFREE) and ‘Business uncertainty differential’ (UNC). This 
means that when these differentials between the U.S. and the remaining countries of the 
panel increase, the values for OFDI tend to decrease. In turn, this indicates that when there 
is a higher level of trade freedom and of uncertainty in the United States compared to the 
level of country i, the flow of direct investment from this country to the U.S. tends to be 
smaller.  
The positive correlation between OFDI and trade freedom seems to contradict the literature 
reviewed, reflecting a positive relationship between FDI in the U.S. and trade protection.  
In contrast, the negative correlation between uncertainty and FDI evidences that an increase 
in uncertainty in the investment recipient country is associated with a decrease in the amount 
invested in that given country. 
Regarding FDI protection (FDIPROT), the correlation between the differential (between 
the U.S. and each of the 19 countries considered) of FDI protection and OFDI is positive, 
which suggests that when there is a higher level of FDI protection in the United States 
compared to that of country i, the direct investment from this country to the U.S. increases. 
Such bi-variate association seems to contradict the theoretical expectations. 
In what concerns the control variables, the GDP per capita (GDP pc), Human Capital and 
R&D expenditures differentials present a negative relationship with OFDI, meaning that the 
larger the difference between the United States and the remaining countries in regards to 
these variables, the lower the flow of FDI from these countries to the U.S.. In contrast, the 
population growth differential is positively correlated with the OFDI.  
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Table 4: Descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
 Variable Description Mean Min Max 
Standard 
Deviation 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 VIF 
Dependent 
variable 
1. Outward 
flows of 
country i to 
U.S. (OFDI) 
Foreign Direct 
Investment in the 
United States by 
country 
73 260.48 -2 755.26 62 476.8 112 710 1        
Core 
independe
nt 
variables 
2. Trade 
Freedom 
differential 
(TRFREE) 
Trade Freedom 
Index of U.S. minus 
the Trade Freedom 
Index of country i 
7.1573 -5.20 65.20 13.0505 -0.4939 1      1.94 
3. FDI 
restrictions 
differential 
(FDIPROT) 
Differential between 
the U.S. and country 
i of index of 
restrictiveness of a 
country’s FDI rules 
-0.03371 -0.5694 0.074 0.1144 0.3457 -0.3881 1     1.23 
4. Business 
uncertainty 
differential 
(UNC) 
Differential of 
Economic Policy 
Uncertainty (EPU) 
Index (based on 
newspaper-based 
EPU Index) between 
the U.S. and country 
i 
-0.5994 -397.64 104.00 48.44 -0.1307 0.0269 -0.0308 1    1.03 
Control 
variables 
5 GDP per 
capita 
differential  
U.S. minus 
country i 
17 198.83 
-17 
369.48 
50 401.29 17 264.21 -0.5613 0.5986 -0.323 0.0012 1   1.88 
6. Population 
growth 
differential 
U.S. minus 
country i 
0.1011 -4.3756 2.5993 0.7518 0.1700 0.1365 0.0143 -0.0020 0.0512 1  1.24 
7. Human 
capital 
differential 
U.S. minus 
country i 
0.6285 -0.0385 1.8929 0.4880 -0.6908 0.4814 -0.1444 0.1205 0.5113 -0.2735 1 2.21 
8. R&D 
differential 
U.S. minus 
country i 
0.0094 -0.0155 0.0247 0.0088 -0.5164 0.3146 -0.1408 0.0056 0.4429 -0.1837 0.5945 1.63 
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4.3. Estimation results 
To estimate the proposed specification, we used a fixed-effects panel model which takes into 
account both time and cross-country variability in FDI outflows targeting the U.S. economy 
(see Table 5).  
The model’s fit is reasonable with an overall R2 of 0.5343 and a F-test statistically significant 
- the p-value is 0.0000 – meaning that the model is globally significant. 
The diagnosis tests performed support the content that there are no problems of 
multicollinearity in the estimated model as the Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) (see Table 
4) are all close to 1 (O’Brien, 2007).19 Moreover, the Breusch-Pagan test allows us to conclude 
that the error variances are constant, that is, estimated errors are homoscedastic. 
In terms of results (see Table 5), our first hypothesis – H1: Protectionism negatively impacts on 
MNEs investment decisions. – in terms of trade of goods and services, is not validated. Indeed, 
the Trade Freedom estimate is statistically significant and negative (-0.2944, with a p-
value<0.01), which means that, on average, all the remaining factors being held constant, a 
larger differential of Trade Freedom between U.S. and a given country is associated to a 
lower level of investment of MNEs of that country in the United States (that is, lower 
Outward Foreign Direct Investment (OFDI) flows from a given country to the U.S.).  
In short, despite the extant theory assert that an increase in the level of protection in terms 
of goods and services trade (lower level of freedom) is harmful for global production 
networks (Görg and Labonte, 2012; Taylor, 2000), our results fail to support this content.  
These results, although contrary to the majority of the literature of FDI, find support in 
Markusen’s theory of “horizontal multinationals” (Markusen, 1984) and knowledge-capital 
model (Carr, Markusen and Maskus, 1998). The argumentation departs from the concept of 
‘horizontal firms’ which invest in plants or subsidiaries in other countries to produce/provide 
their product/service as they do in their home country. This type of investment is most used 
when trade costs are high (and the countries are more developed) as a way to surpass these 
costs. MNEs invest in the country where they want to sell their products/services to produce 
locally and, therefore, avoid the costs of entry of exports.  
Thus, our results seem to suggest that OFDI reflects the strategic decisions of MNEs which 
use direct investment as a way of being present in the U.S. market avoiding the increased 
                                               
 
19 See also https://statisticalhorizons.com/multicollinearity, accessed on May 2018. 
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costs that U.S. trade protectionist measures induce. Such strategic decisions lead to an 
increase in the OFDI to the U.S. when the level of trade freedom in U.S. decreases 
(protectionism increases) in comparison to the level of trade freedom in their country of 
origin. 
 
Table 5: Fixed effect panel data estimation (dependent variable: Outward FDI to the U.S.) 
Independent Variable Variable description Estimated coefficient 
Trade Freedom 
U.S. Trade Freedom Index minus country i 
Trade Freedom Index 
-0.2944*** 
(0.0927) 
FDI protectionism 
U.S. index of restrictiveness regarding FDI 
rules minus country i index of restrictiveness 
regarding FDI rules 
0.9989*** 
(0.3410) 
Uncertainty 
U.S. Economic Policy Uncertainty Index 
minus country i Economic Policy Uncertainty 
Index 
-0.0114 
(0.1063) 
GDP pc U.S. GDP pc minus country i’s GDP pc 
-0.1545* 
(0.0856) 
Population growth 
U.S. Population growth minus country i’s 
Population growth 
-1.1897*** 
(0.2185) 
Human Capital 
U.S. Human Capital minus country i’s Human 
Capital pc 
-3.7809*** 
(0.4576) 
R&D expenditure 
U.S. R&D expenditure minus country i’s 
R&D expenditure 
-54.0480*** 
(12.50613) 
Diagnosis tests 
Variance Inflation Factors (VIFs) All below 3 
Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroscedasticity - chi2(1) (p-value) 
0.63 
(0.4291) 
Hausman test - chi2(1) (p-value) 
16.67 
(0.0196) 
Goodness of fit 
F-Statistic 
22.75 
(0.000) 
R2 0.5343 
 Number of observations 399 
Note: ***(**)[*] statistically significant 1% (5%) [10%]. All variables are in logarithms. Grey cells identify statistically significant estimates. 
 
In terms of FDI protection, the estimate is significant and positive (0.9989, with a p-
value<0.01). The positive relationship between FDI protection and OFDI indicates that, 
ceteris paribus, a higher protection differential over foreign investment in the U.S. in relation 
to that of a given country leads to MNEs from this country to invest more in the United 
States.  
This appears to be a contradictory relationship, as the imposition of governmental barriers 
to foreign investment would serve as a hindrance to investment (Bitzenis and Szamosi, 2009). 
However, the result obtained can be explained by a closer observation of the available and 
relevant data. Table 6 presents the evolution of the values of FDI Restrictiveness Index for 
our seven groups and the United States, over five selected years.  
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We can observe that the level of FDI Restrictiveness of the United States across the 21 years 
of observation (1996-2016) does not change, being equal to 0.089 in all years. As a result, the 
variance of the differential of FDI protection between the U.S. and the other countries comes 
exclusively from the latter.  
A smaller differential of FDI Restrictiveness Index between the U.S. and a country i suggests 
that a MNE from this country faces less restrictions when investing in the United States. As 
the index measures barriers over both the inflows and outflows of FDI, the MNE faces less 
restrictions to the outflow in its country of origin but the same level of restrictions in the 
U.S.. In this way, we can conclude that the model estimates that when an MNE faces less 
restrictions to the outflow of FDI in its country of origin (and so, the differential between 
the U.S. and this country increases), it will increase its investment in the United States, and 
vice-versa.  
Therefore, our first hypothesis, which stated that protectionist measures have a negative 
impact on MNEs’ investment decisions, is, in fact, confirmed for FDI protection. 
 
Table 6: FDI Restrictiveness Index per country group 
Country/Group 
FDI Restrictiveness Index 
1996 2000 2005 2010 2016 
Europe 0.037 0.039 0.042 0.052 0.052 
Russia 0.338 0.338 0.308 0.180 0.187 
China & India* 0.554 0.490 0.366 0.353 0.270 
Asia Pacific 0.370 0.176 0.102 0.098 0.094 
Australia 0.269 0.256 0.240 0.128 0.146 
Latin America 0.165 0.147 0.127 0.125 0.117 
Canada 0.268 0.265 0.263 0.175 0.166 
United States 0.089 0.089 0.089 0.089 0.089 
Note: *values for 1997, 2003, 2006, 2010 and 2016 because of data availability. 
 
In what respects the second hypothesis - H2: Uncertainty negatively impacts on MNEs investment 
decisions – the result fails to validate it.  
Although the signal of the estimate is negative indicating that a higher uncertainty 
(differential between the U.S. and the country of origin of the FDI) is associated with an 
29 
increased risk of an investment and thus a decrease in outward FDI flows, the coefficient is 
not statistically significant. In short, while uncertainty might, through the increase of 
investment risk, discourage FDI at times, we cannot conclude that it is a decisive factor for 
MNEs’ decision regarding the investment in the U.S.. 
Concerning the control variables, all present statistically significant and negative coefficients. 
This means that when the differential between the U.S. and a given country increases, the 
level of FDI from this country to the U.S. decreases, that is when the U.S. observe an increase 
in its GDP pc, population, Human Capital level and R&D expenditure in relation to a given 
country i, the MNEs based in this country (proxied by the outward FDI flows) tend to invest 
less in the U.S..  
These latter results seem to indicate that MNEs do not explore investment opportunities in 
the U.S. for market-seeking or resource-seeking reasons. In other words, MNEs are not likely 
to pursue investments in the U.S. to take advantage of higher economic growth or market 
size, nor to exploit the stronger competencies of the U.S. in term of human, technological 
resources or innovation.  
Other reasons might nevertheless underlie OFDI to the U.S., such as efficiency, location, 
strategic or political reasons (Bitzenis Szamosi, 2009;Taylor, 2000). In particular, MNEs 
might target the U.S. using a strategy of ‘export-platform FDI’, this is, as a path to overcome 
trade barriers and/or to exploit Free Trade Agreements (Fugazza and Trentini, 2014) that 
the United States established with other countries (e.g., Trans-Pacific Partnership Agreement 
or North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA)), serving not only the local American 
market but also surrounding markets through production facility in the U.S.. If a company is 
looking to explore, for example, growth opportunities in Brazil or Chile, it might resort to 
export-platform FDI in the U.S. as a way to produce in this country, which possess higher 
quality institutions and lower institutional uncertainty (as shown above in our exploratory 
results), and then export to Latin America. Companies would avoid protectionist barriers to 
trade while investing in a country with better investment/business conditions, smaller risk 
or a better trade-off between risk and return (Fugazza and Trentini, 2014).  
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5. Conclusion 
The main goal of the present dissertation was to assess the impact of the trade policy and 
economic uncertainty on the investment decisions of foreign MNEs. Using the U.S. as the 
reference country, we investigated whether the outward foreign direct investment flows from 
19 countries to the U.S. (proxy for MNEs strategic investment decisions) were determined 
by the differentials (between the U.S. and those 19 countries) in the levels of trade and 
investment protection and uncertainty. 
Although voluminous, extant literature on trade barriers and FDI (Sauvant, 2009; 
Globerman, 2016) have not yet account for the economic/business uncertainty that is likely 
to influence FDI. Additionally, FDI studies that addressed the issue of economic uncertainty 
(Akiba and Deseatnicov, 2016; Bloom, 2017)) overlooked the empirical analysis of the impact 
of protectionist measures on FDI. 
In order to respond to the dissertation’s research question – Do protectionism and business 
uncertainty impact on MNEs’ strategic investment decisions? – we built a panel which 
includes the U.S. plus 19 countries from North, Central and South America, Europe, Asia 
and Oceania, which represent 71% of the U.S. total inward FDI20, over the last two decades 
(1996 to 2016). Methodologically, we resort to fixed-effect panel data techniques, and 
uncover several main results.  
First, MNEs tend to invest more in the U.S. (i.e., the OFDI to the U.S. is higher) when, in 
comparison to the home country, the level of trade protection in the U.S. increases. Such 
strategic decision suggests that FDI is a substitute for trade, that is, FDI is used to overcome 
the higher trading costs.  
Second, home country’s higher level of FDI protection discourages investment in the U.S.. 
Third, the differentials in terms of economic uncertainty failed to explain OFDI/MNEs 
strategic investment decisions in the U.S..  
Fourth, market size and/or high level factor resources (Human Capital, technology) are not 
the primary reason for the 19 countries’ MNEs to invest in the U.S.. Instead, results seem to 
suggest that export platform and complex-vertical investment strategies have been driving 
FDI decisions, in the line of what has been found in Fugazza and Trentini (2014). Such 
strategic investments enable MNEs to exploit highly dynamic emerging, but institutionally 
                                               
 
20 According to data from the Bureau of Economic Analysis 
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feeble, markets while taking advantage of the business and technological advantages the 
United States have to offer. By horizontally investing in the United States and, from this 
country, export to other regions, MNEs can reduce their investment risk and trade costs 
while establishing themselves in a country where they believe that, even if there is an increase 
in business uncertainty, the higher returns will compensate for the higher risk. 
The present study provides two main scientific contributions.  
First, it develops an integrated and quantitative analysis of the impact of protectionism and 
business uncertainty on MNEs strategic investment decisions. Up to the present date extant 
literature did not focus, simultaneously, on trade protection, uncertainty and the impact these 
variables might have on FDI flows We found, controlling for a wide set of factors which are 
likely to influence OFDI, that protectionism, but not uncertainty, significantly impacts on 
MNEs strategic investment decisions in the U.S..  
Regarding the impact of trade openness in FDI flows, existing studies, which focus on the 
straight relationship between FDI and protectionism (e.g., Taylor, 2000; Görg and Labonte, 
2012), mostly conclude that increased protectionist measures towards goods and services 
reduce a country’s investment attractiveness. By disrupting global production networks, 
protection over international commerce hinders the connection and trade between 
headquarters and foreign subsidies. Our study, however, shows that, in the case of the U.S., 
a different explanation prevails, by demonstrating that MNEs are likely to use FDI as a mean 
to overcome a greater trade protection faced in the U.S.. 
In terms of uncertainty, most studies (e.g., Bloom, 2017; Shroff, Verdi and Yu, 2014), mainly 
of theoretical stance and with a generalist nature, focus on exchange rate and environment-
driven uncertainty to argue that FDI flows to a given country diminish when a country faces 
a higher investment risk. Our empirical study shows that, when controlling for protectionism, 
although there is a negative relationship between uncertainty and international investment 
flows, uncertainty fails to emerge as a critical factor for MNEs’ investment decisions.  
The second scientific contribution lies in the fact that our study considers bilateral flows and 
country differentials in the protectionism and uncertainty measures, instead of global 
averages, allowing for a better understanding of the MNEs strategic investment decisions. 
We perform a macroeconomic analysis to analyze the decision making of MNEs in terms of 
international investment, differentiating ourselves from most studies regarding multinational 
enterprises’ investment decisions, which are performed in a micro perspective (Shroff, Verdi 
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and Yu, 2014; Lee and Song, 2012), and from most studies of FDI, which consider this 
variable in a global manner (e.g., Sauvant, 2009; Yao and Wei, 2007). 
The present study has important policy implications.  
First, results imply that an increased liberalization of FDI restrictions by a given home 
country fosters the foreign expansion of those countries’ MNEs. Our study also points to 
the conclusion that, if the U.S. decrease the investment barriers foreign companies face when 
investing in the country, they can increase their inward flows of FDI. Furthermore, the 
results obtained showcase that an increase in trade protection in a given country might have 
the collateral effect of increasing the investment of MNEs to that country as a way to 
overcome the higher trade costs. This conclusion can be very important when a country 
assesses, for example, the costs and benefits of tariff increases. 
A second policy implication lies in the strategy MNEs use when investing in the U.S.. Our 
study suggests that companies look for investment opportunities in the U.S. on an export-
platform FDI basis, as they might seek to use this country not just to serve its internal market 
but also to take advantage of its trade agreements with regions which present themselves as 
a less viable investment choice. As such, the U.S. can foster inward FDI flows by promoting 
conditions that facilitate and encourage this practice, not just in regards to the country of 
origin of the FDI flows, but also in terms of third party-countries (good potential exports’ 
destiny), by, for example, establishing or broadening trade agreements. 
Despite the novelty and scientific contributions of the present study, there are some 
limitations that need to be highlighted.  
Firstly, the indicators chosen as proxies for our core variables – FDI protectionism and 
uncertainty - do not cover some important aspects. In terms of FDI protectionism, the proxy 
selected, OECD’s FDI Restrictiveness Index, measures the barriers imposed on FDI by 
focusing on four points: equity restrictions, discriminatory screening or approval 
mechanisms, restrictions on key foreign personnel and operational restrictions. This excludes 
some barriers, namely legal framework, infrastructure and other macroeconomic conditions; 
these include measures not directly taken to deter foreign investment. Another important 
aspect is that this index fits simultaneously barriers to both inward and outward FDI flows, 
thus not allowing for a better measurement of each individually. In what concerns the proxy 
chosen for uncertainty, Economic Policy Uncertainty Index, it also presents some flaws. This 
measure is constructed based on the monthly number of own-country newspaper articles 
that debate economic policy uncertainty, tax code changes and disagreements over economic 
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forecasts. Although this is one of the best current measures of uncertainty, it still presents 
itself as a flawed indicator: the number of uncertainty related articles do not reflect their 
severity and a general agreement of a negative economic forecast might also affect 
uncertainty and not be reflected by this index. Furthermore, for some countries (e.g. 
Netherlands, Sweden) the index is not built by the same authors that initially created the 
EPU Index and who implemented it for most countries. 
Secondly, we have assumed that the U.S.’s inward FDI flows represent a good proxy for 
foreign MNEs investment decisions. However, this does not take into account the individual 
decisions of multinational corporations inside each country and the differences between the 
characteristics of these companies. Such endeavor would require to depart from a 
microeconomic analysis and then to proceed to an aggregation to reach the macroeconomic 
level and answer the questions we put forward in the present dissertation. 
Finally, we based our study and constructed our panel on bilateral relationships between the 
U.S. and its main trade partners. However, when deciding where to invest, MNEs might not 
focus exclusively on the relationship between their country of origin and the U.S.. Instead, 
they might analyze different opportunities in other countries to estimate the potential 
opportunity costs of investing in the U.S. or any of those countries. Therefore, to fully 
understand the impact of protectionism and uncertainty on MNE global strategic investment 
decisions in the U.S., it would be important to consider the differential between the U.S. and 
a weighted average of that indicator for  a set of countries and not only the MNEs’ home 
country. 
Given the above mentioned limitations, further challenging and interesting avenues for 
future research emerge: 1) devising new indicators to measure FDI protection (which covers 
a wider range of investment barriers) and uncertainty (which would be constructed from a 
different basis and with a more homogeneous implementation over all countries); 2) consider 
MNEs investment decisions resorting to multilateral relationships among countries; 3) 
consider, instead of bilateral differentials (of protectionism and uncertainty) between the U.S. 
and a given home country, the differential between the U.S. and a weighted average of a 
larger set of alternative countries that MNEs could consider as investment targets. 
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Appendix 
Table A 1: List of the 19 U.S. main trading partners 
 
Australia 
Brazil 
Canada 
Chile 
China 
France 
Germany 
India 
Ireland 
Italy 
Japan 
Mexico 
Netherlands 
Russia 
Singapore 
South Korea 
Spain 
Sweden 
United Kingdom 
 
